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Autonomous Link Spam Detection in Purely Collaborative Environments
Abstract
Collaborative models (e.g., wikis) are an increasingly prevalent Web technology. However, the openaccess that defines such systems can also be utilized for nefarious purposes. In particular, this paper
examines the use of collaborative functionality to add inappropriate hyperlinks to destinations outside the
host environment (i.e., link spam). The collaborative encyclopedia, Wikipedia, is the basis for our analysis.
Recent research has exposed vulnerabilities in Wikipedia's link spam mitigation, finding that human
editors are latent and dwindling in quantity. To this end, we propose and develop an autonomous
classifier for link additions. Such a system presents unique challenges. For example, low barriers-to-entry
invite a diversity of spam types, not just those with economic motivations. Moreover, issues can arise
with how a link is presented (regardless of the destination).
In this work, a spam corpus is extracted from over 235,000 link additions to English Wikipedia. From this,
40+ features are codified and analyzed. These indicators are computed using "wiki" metadata, landing
site analysis, and external data sources. The resulting classifier attains 64% recall at 0.5% false-positives
(ROC-AUC=0.97). Such performance could enable egregious link additions to be blocked automatically
with low false-positive rates, while prioritizing the remainder for human inspection. Finally, a live Wikipedia
implementation of the technique has been developed.
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ABSTRACT

1. INTRODUCTION

Collaborative models (e.g., wikis) are an increasingly prevalent Web technology. However, the open-access that defines
such systems can also be utilized for nefarious purposes.
In particular, this paper examines the use of collaborative
functionality to add inappropriate hyperlinks to destinations
outside the host environment (i.e., link spam). The collaborative encyclopedia, Wikipedia, is the basis for our analysis.
Recent research has exposed vulnerabilities in Wikipedia’s
link spam mitigation, finding that human editors are latent
and dwindling in quantity. To this end, we propose and develop an autonomous classifier for link additions. Such a system presents unique challenges. For example, low barriersto-entry invite a diversity of spam types, not just those with
economic motivations. Moreover, issues can arise with how
a link is presented (regardless of the destination).
In this work, a spam corpus is extracted from over 235,000
link additions to English Wikipedia. From this, 40+ features
are codified and analyzed. These indicators are computed
using wiki metadata, landing site analysis, and external data
sources. The resulting classifier attains 64% recall at 0.5%
false-positives (ROC-AUC= 0.97). Such performance could
enable egregious link additions to be blocked automatically
with low false-positive rates, while prioritizing the remainder
for human inspection. Finally, a live Wikipedia implementation of the technique has been developed.

As of this writing, six of the Internet’s ten most-trafficked
sites depend heavily on collaborative or user-generated content [2]. For example, the collaborative encyclopedia, Wikipedia [9], received over 88 billion page views last year to
its English edition [15]. Such cooperative environments are
unique in that end-users can add to, and sometimes modify,
others’ content. Additionally, such systems often encourage
participation via intentionally minimal barriers-to-entry.
Unsurprisingly, malicious users see these characteristics as
an asset: open-access permissions allow attacks to be carried
out at low marginal cost, and those attacks have the potential to reach a large number of viewers. The malicious use on
which this paper is focused is link spamming, the insertion of
inappropriate hyperlinks (often to selfish ends). The pervasiveness and detection of such behavior has been the subject
of recent research as it pertains to social networks [22] and
forum/blog comments [16, 25, 30, 37].
However, little link spam research has been done in purely
collaborative settings, such as Wikipedia (the focus of this
writing). Most applications are only partially collaborative
because of constraints on the editing model. For example,
social networks often provide only local (peer-group) access. Similarly, blogs/forums are generally append-only in
nature. Without these constraints, wiki environments could
be among the most attractive to link spam attackers.
Despite having extensive anti-spam infrastructure [41], recent research confirms Wikipedia’s vulnerability. The encyclopedia’s primary weakness appears to be its reliance on
human-driven link spam mitigation. Our prior work [41]
suggests attack vectors to exploit human detection latency,
showing it feasible to conduct profitable link spam campaigns. Similarly, Goldman [23] observes that a shrinking editor/administrative population and growing readership may make Wikipedia a more viable target. Finally, [37]
indicates human protections may be insufficient against
mechanized and increasingly intelligent blackhat software.
Addressing these shortcomings, this work proposes an autonomous classifier for link additions in purely collaborative
environments. To create the classifier, a corpus was parsed
from over 235,000 link additions to English Wikipedia. For
each link added, we collected: (1) Wikipedia metadata (article, editor, etc.), (2) source code of the document being
linked, and (3) third-party data about the URL (malware
status, web statistics). These links were then labeled (spam
or ham) using the implicit actions of Wikipedia experts.
This corpus was then used to identify features indicative of
spam behavior, emphasizing those aspects unique to purely
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K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection
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collaborative settings. Here, we identify, describe, and provide an intuitive basis for over 40 such features. Then, a
classifier built from these is evaluated using cross-validation.
We find that the model is capable of detecting 64% of
spam links with 0.5% false-positives. Such performance lags
considerably behind that seen in other anti-spam domains
(i.e., email) and speaks to the difficulty of the task. However, some quantity of link spam can certainly be blocked
autonomously. Beyond that, classification scores can help
prioritize the manual efforts of anti-spam defenders; a vast
improvement over the brute-force strategies currently employed. The proposed system has the potential to be an
asset not just for the health and survival of Wikipedia, but
to the collaborative paradigm as a whole.
The novel contributions of this work are four-fold:
1. Identification of link spam detection features unique to
purely collaborative environments (i.e.,wikis).
2. Evaluation of link spam features found useful in partially collaborative settings (e.g., blogs, UGC sites), in
a purely collaborative environment.
3. Establishment of a corpus and performance baseline
for link spam detection on which future work can build.
4. Implementation of our technique in a live setting, to
the benefit of a user community.
This paper proceeds as follows: First, Wikipedia fundamentals are covered (Sec. 2) prior to discussing related work
(Sec. 3). Then, a corpus is created (Sec. 4), features extracted (Sec. 5), and the resulting model evaluated (Sec. 6).
Next, our practical live implementation is discussed (Sec. 7),
before discussing evasion/gamesmanship strategies (Sec. 8).
Finally, concluding remarks are made (Sec. 9).

2.

BACKGROUND

In this section, preliminaries for the remainder of this
work are established. First, general terminology is discussed
(Sec. 2.1), before covering those aspects specific to link spam
(Sec. 2.2). Then, the status quo defenses Wikipedia employs
against link spammers are examined (Sec. 2.3).

2.1 Terminology
Wikipedia [9] is a collaborative encyclopedia consisting of
many articles 1 . Each article consists of a version history,
H = {r0 , r1 , r2 , . . .}, where r0 is an empty version. One creates a new version by performing an edit or revision, and
these are most often visualized by computing the diff between rn−1 and rn . When a new version, rn , duplicates the
content of a previous one, ri,i<n , it is termed a revert or
undo. Reverts are of interest because they are often used to
correct damaging contributions.
Those who make edits are termed editors or contributors.
Taken as a whole, the user-base is often called a community.
Contributors can edit anonymously with no barrier-to-entry,
or become registered and have persistent credentials.
Articles on Wikipedia are inter-connected using hyperlinks. When an article references another (internal) article,
this is termed a wikilink. When the reference points outside
the encyclopedia, it is an external link. A syntax defines how
external links are created [11], and this writing concerns itself only with well-formed links of this kind.
1 While discussion is Wikipedia specific, these concepts apply
broadly to all collaborative applications.

2.2 Defining Link Spam
Put simply, any external link that violates Wikipedia policy [11] is considered to be link spam 2,3 . A link can be
inappropriate due to its: (1) destination or (2) presentation.
A link’s destination is the web property to which the link
points, usually an HTML page (also called the landing site).
Links to commercial sites are generally prohibited, as are
those unfit for encyclopedic use (e.g., most blogs, personal
sites, etc.). Presentation concerns itself with on-wiki placement. For example, links must be context appropriate and
the appearance (font, size, etc.) should be according to convention. Those who conduct link spam are termed spammers. However, it should be emphasized that not all unconstructive additions are made with malicious intent.
Making a spam/ham distinction is no trivial task, especially given Wikipedia’s subjective policies. Fortunately,
when a corpus is assembled in Sec. 4, Wikipedia experts
are relied upon to perform labeling on a case-by-case basis.

2.3 Wikipedia Anti-Spam
A thorough description of Wikipedia’s anti-spam functionality can be found in our prior work [41], which is briefly
summarized here. First, HTML nofollow is applied to all
outgoing links. Thus, Wikipedia cannot be used to attain
backlinks for search-engine optimization (SEO) purposes.
Instead, spammers must solicit direct traffic to obtain utility
from the links they place (i.e., via click-throughs).
Evidence suggests that the majority of spam links are discovered using brute-force patrolling strategies, where human
users manually inspect link additions. Simple systems assist patrollers in this task. For example, an IRC channel
reports link additions and another tool provides aggregate
link information (e.g., all the articles in which some URL
appears) [14]. Additional functionality targets systematic
abuse (a URL blacklist [13], anti-bot extensions [8], etc.)
Assuming a URL does not have an abusive history (triggering systematic protections), all anti-spam efforts are mitigative – being applied after the link has gone live. Thus,
there is an inherent latency between the insertion of a spam
link and its removal. Since practically all of these efforts are
human-driven, such latencies can be lengthy, and spammers
can harness these windows of opportunity [41].
The proposal of this paper is a preventative system which
is brought to bear immediately on link additions. Egregious
contributions can be undone4 without human intervention
(as false-positive tolerances permit). Beyond that, classification scores can be used to prioritize the efforts of patrollers,
minimizing their latency (relative to random search).

3. RELATED WORK
Here, related work is surveyed – both Wikipedia specific
(Sec. 3.1) and in alternative collaborative settings (Sec. 3.2).
2 Other forms of Wikipedia spam exist. For example, entire articles could be created to advertise some product/service. These
alternative forms are not considered in this writing.
3 This definition of “link spam” is broader than that in other domains (e.g., blog comments). However, all inappropriate links are
“undesirable traffic” from Wikipedia’s perspective, so we believe
the “spam” terminology is appropriate.
4 Since our tool will not be integrated into the wiki software directly, it cannot block link spam. Instead, it will actually revert
live links. However, the tool’s speed will make this distinction
irrelevant, and therefore it is a de facto preventative system.

3.1 Wikipedia Specific
On Wikipedia, link spam is a subset of vandalism, a term
describing all unconstructive edits. Much research has examined vandalism and its detection [17, 34, 35]. This includes bots operating autonomously [18] and user-driven intelligent routing tools that assist patrollers [6, 40].
However, most vandalism is not spam [35], and thus the
aforementioned tools are not specifically designed to detect
it. Quite the opposite, most vandalism is offensive or nonsensical [35], leading to the heavy use of natural-language
processing (NLP) in the development of detection schemes.
While it seems unlikely that a spammer trying to garner
traffic would engage in such language patterns, this writing
still builds on anti-vandalism work. For example, metadata
and reputation features [17, 42] can be used agnostic of the
content type. This work examines how such features perform
when used exclusively for link spam detection (Sec. 5.1).
Furthermore, an anti-vandalism GUI tool [40] is repurposed
for use by link spam patrollers (Sec. 7.3).
While link spam may not be the most common form of
vandalism currently, recent work [23, 41] has suggested vulnerabilities. Spammers may be likely to exploit these weaknesses given their well-incentivized nature. We presume link
spammers aim to profit from their actions (be it financial or
simply narcissistic). Therefore, they should be motivated to
avoid detection and actively evade protections (Sec. 8).
Our prior work [41] was the first to examine Wikipedia
link spam in-depth. After showing that status quo spam
behaviors on Wikipedia were inefficient, we proposed a novel
and aggressive attack model which estimation showed could
be carried out at profit. The viability of such an attack
was a primary motivator of this work. The efforts herein
construct a similar corpus (Sec. 4), but use it to identify
features indicative of spamming behaviors (Sec. 5). Our
approach intends to detect both status quo spam strategies
(as of this writing, an annoying, but non-pervasive issue) and
those more aggressive proposals of our earlier work5 (which
could have more devastating affects if unchecked).

3.2 Alternative Domains
The bulk of research on link spam detection has been performed in domains besides wikis, such as blogs/forums [16,
30] and social networks [22]. Strategies for preventing and
mitigating such spam were broadly surveyed in [27]. This
work examines if these techniques are applicable within the
unique confines of a wiki/Wikipedia environment.
For example, analysis of destination content (i.e., HTML)
is one such strategy, attempting to quantify “commercial
intention” and SEO strategies [19, 31]. Sec. 5.2 examines
how these techniques fare on Wikipedia, where nofollow is
used and most link spam is not commercial in nature [41].
Another oft-proposed technique is semantic NLP analysis,
i.e., measuring how well an addition fits into the context of
existing content [29, 31]. However, such measures may prove
less beneficial on Wikipedia where prior research indicates a
lack of “blanket spamming” [41] and one can easily find an
article relevant to any link destination.
The above evidence suggests there may be difficulty in applying blog/forum detection techniques6 to Wikipedia. Yet,
5 Note that because [41] proposes novel attack vectors, such behaviors are not captured in our corpus. Thus, static rules must
be written to prevent spam campaigns of that kind (see Sec. 7.2).
6 Two systems believed to be employing such techniques are Ak-

the purely collaborative nature of wikis permits novel features not possible in such partially collaborative settings.
For instance, blog comments are typically append-only in
nature, while content can be inserted at arbitrary positions
in wikis. Such Wikipedia-driven features are identified, discussed, and leveraged in Sec. 5.1.
Recent work [37] also examines blackhat/SEO spamming
software that specifically targets collaborative functionality
(including wikis). That writing proposes that such software
can be detected by packet-level analysis. Not having access to Wikipedia’s network traffic flows, we are unable to
quantify the performance of such techniques.
Finally, it deserves mention that Wikipedia anti-spam is
an entirely volunteer effort. In contrast, profit-oriented sites
often employ dedicated individuals to perform content inspection [38]. Thus, it seems especially pertinent to optimize what shrinking human resources are available [23], as
our live implementation attempts to do (Sec. 7).

4. SPAM CORPUS
Next, the production of a link spam corpus is discussed.
This required collecting external links added to Wikipedia,
as well as associated data (Sec. 4.1). Then, spam/ham labels
were applied to a subset of these additions (Sec. 4.2).

4.1 Link Collection
Wikipedia link additions were collected in real-time using
an extension to the STiki framework [40]. By examining
every diff to Wikipedia’s article namespace (ignoring user
profiles, discussion pages, etc.), external link additions were
parsed per their syntax [11]. For each link added, data fields
were retrieved and stored at three granularity:
1. Wikipedia: Using [7], all wiki metadata for the link is
stored (editor, article, timestamp, edit summary). The
URL and its hypertext description are also recorded,
along with the full text of the article of appearance.
2. Landing site: Visiting the URL of the external link,
the source code of the destination is obtained.
3. Third-party: Data was obtained about the URL via
the Google Safe-Browsing Project [5, 36] (malware and
phishing lists) and the Alexa Web Information Service [3] (whois fields, backlink quantity, etc.)
Data was collected during portions of Feb. and Mar. 2011,
retrieving over 235,000 rows, consuming roughly 20GB of
storage. It should be noted that the fetching/archival of
arbitrary Internet documents does raise certain legal and
ethical issues (e.g., child pornography [43]). On the advice
and approval of our institution’s General Counsel, steps were
taken to avoid acquiring/rendering image content.

4.2 Link Labeling
Having acquired link data, we produce a corpus of labeled
spam/ham entries. The corpus composition is summarized
by Fig. 1. Then, the accuracy and consequences of this
labeling approach are discussed. As a preliminary, only rows
where the destination is an HTML document are considered
(all file types can be handled in practice, see Sec. 7.1). This
filter removed some 50,000 (21%) of rows from eligibility.
ismet [1] and Defensio [4]. These services are closed-source commercial offerings filtering blog comments and other postings. An
exacting comparison is not possible due to their proprietary nature. Our system’s implementation (Sec. 7) is free/open-source.
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Figure 1: Summarizing corpus creation
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Labeling Spam Revisions: To find spam edits, we rely
upon a technique developed in prior literature [41, 42]: the
rollback action is an expedited form of revert/undo available
to privileged users. Rollback is only appropriate when undoing “blatantly unproductive” contributions, and thus any
edit undone via rollback can be considered vandalism [42].
However, extracting the link spam subset requires additional work. First, we consider only rolled-back edits where
exactly one link was added. Then, manually inspecting those
diffs, we discard revisions where modifications were made
apart from the link and its immediate supporting context.
The remaining revisions are link spam. Intuitively, we know
these to be link spam edits because the link is the only
change made, and therefore the decision to rollback the edit
speaks directly to the inappropriateness of that one link [41].
Of the 188,210 collected links with HTML destinations,
2,865 (1.5%) were undone via the rollback action. Of these,
1,510 were the only link added in their edit. Finally, 1,095
passed the manual inspection and “no-bot” criteria7 , forming
the spam portion of the corpus.
Labeling Ham Revisions: Having identified link spam edits, the complementary ham labels are produced. Desiring
accurate tags and low noise, it is insufficient to treat all nonspam links as appropriate ones (as done in prior work [41]).
To arrive at ham labels, we consider those links added by
privileged users. Given that we trust such individuals to
label poor additions, by extension, they can be trusted to
apply the same wisdom when adding links. For consistency,
these links are also subjected to the “one link added”, “manual inspection”, and “no bot” filters.
Of the 188,210 links with HTML destinations, 50,108
(26.6%) were added by a user with rollback privileges. Of
these, 4,867 met all criteria for inclusion.
Discussion: Combining the labeled sets, we arrive at a
corpus8 with 5,962 entries: 81.6% ham and 18.4% spam (see
Fig. 1). Given the labeling technique, this does not speak
to the actual prevalence of inappropriate links.
Though just 2.5% of all links collected are in the final corpus, our labeling strategy allows us to arrive at tags with
high confidence. This strategy is an advantageous one because it: (1) autonomously operates based on implicit actions, (2) allows a case-by-case interpretation of link spam,
and (3) leverages the experience and knowledge of Wikipedia
experts. Trusting these experts is justified: just one spam
edit (0.09% of spam) was committed by a privileged user.
However, as a consequence of the labeling technique some
7 To maintain a human validated set, edits that were undone (or
made) by autonomous bots were removed from analysis.
8 Efforts to open-source the corpus are encumbered due to it containing: (1) potentially copyrighted/illegal content, and (2) nonfree data points [3]. Interested parties should contact the authors.

Figure 2: Top-level domain (URL_TLD)
features cannot be utilized. All ham edits are made by privileged users, making it biasing to encode how they attained
or wield that status. For example, “user registration status”
and “account age” are two prohibited features that would
otherwise be of interest. Similarly, quantifying diff magnitude is inappropriate given the “context criteria.” Such biases are carefully avoided when developing features in Sec. 5.
Other corpus constraints are less severe, and Sec. 7.1 describes generalizations so our classifier can score all edits.

5. FEATURE SELECTION
The corpus is used to determine features indicative of link
spam behavior. Space considerations9 prevent a comprehensive discussion of all features, which Tab. 1 lists. Such
a diversity of features is needed because of varying spam
strategies [41]. For example, one could use subtle strategies,
in the hopes of having a link become embedded with a long
survival time. Alternatively, an attacker could be aggressive,
attempting to maximize utility until detection.
This write-up concentrates on novel features and those
weighted heavily in the classifier (see Tab. 1). Discussion
closely follows the presentation order of that table. Features
are organized by data source: Wikipedia (Sec. 5.1), the landing site (Sec. 5.2), and third-party services (Sec. 5.3). All
features operate only on information available at the time
an edit was committed (i.e., zero-delay detection [17]).

5.1 Wikipedia-driven
Wikipedia-specific features are our starting point. While
some “metadata” and “article” based signals are inspired by
anti-vandalism work [17, 34], we also develop novel features
capturing properties of link presentation and history.
URL Properties: The URL itself is first scrutinized10 .
At median, spam URLs are 1.7× shorter than ham ones
(URL_LEN, Tab. 2), likely because spam links point to domains 30% more often than a specific file (URL_IS_DOMAIN,
Tab. 2). This is intuitive: “main pages” are unlikely to contain encyclopedic information, but can be promotional.
Similarly, Fig. 2 visualizes data about the top-level domain utilized (URL_TLD). It is unsurprising to see that *.gov
and *.edu TLDs are well-behaved, given their greater administrative governance. Appropriately, *.info domains are
penalized, as these are some of the cheapest domains to register and could therefore be used in Sybil attacks [20].
9 Our open-source implementation (Sec. 7) allows feature calculation to be examined at greater depth.
10 We consider these to be “wiki” features because they are a matter
of presentation; a single landing site could have multiple URLs.
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URL_TLD
URL_LEN
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LINK_IS_CITE
LINK_PLACEMENT
LINK_TEXT_LEN
LINK_DISCUSSED
ART_TS_CREATION
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ART_REFERENCES
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SITE_RELEVANT
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DESCRIPTION
Top-level domain of the URL (e.g., *.com or *.edu)
Length (in characters) of the URL being added
Whether the URL points to a broad domain/folder or specific file
Quantity of subdomains in the URL (i.e., sub.example.com = 3)
Whether the link was added per a special reference/citation format
Where in the article the link was added (as function of article length)
Length (in characters) of the hypertext description of added link
Whether the link/URL is found on the article’s discussion page
Age of the article to which link was added (i.e., time-since creation)
Historical, time-decayed measure of vandalism/controversy on article, per [40]
Quantity of citations/references in the article of link addition
Length of the Wikipedia article to which the link was added
Article visitors in last t ∈ {hour, day, week, month, 6-months}, per [10]
Article edits committed in last t ∈ {hour, day, week, month, 6-months}
Links to URL added in last t ∈ {hour, day, week, month, 6-months}
Links to domain added in last t ∈ {hour, day, week, month, 6-months}
Historical, time-decayed measure of spam-iness for added URL
Of all the times the URL has been linked, the % added by the current editor
Historical, time-decayed measure of spam-iness for added domain
Of all the times the domain has been linked, the % added by the current editor
Length (in characters) of the revision summary
Time-of-day when the link was added (UTC locale)
Day-of-week when the link was added (UTC locale)
Measure of the prevalence of profane language on the landing site
Quantity of images displayed on the landing site
Size (in bytes) of the textual content on the landing site
Ratio of raw content-size to compressed size; speaks to repetitiveness
Length of the HTML title, in characters (i.e., <title>. . . </title>)
Quantity of HTML <meta keywords="w1 , w2 , . . . , wn "> on site
The average word length of visible textual content on the landing site
Measure of the commercial intent of the landing site
Whether the landing site is topic-similar to Wikipedia article of addition
Quantity of incoming links to landing site, per the crawling by [3]
Meta-feature speaking to site’s historical traffic patterns, per [3]
Whether or not the URL contains adult content, per [3]
Load time of landing site, as a percentile of all sites, per [3]
Time that the landing site has been online, per the crawling by [3]
Continent to which the whois registration of site maps, per [3]
Whether URL is active on the Safe-Browsing “malware” list, per [5]
Whether URL is active on the Safe-Browsing “phishing” list, per [5]

Table 1: Comprehensive listing of features used, organized by data source. Sources are: (W )ikipedia,
(L)anding site, and (T )hird-party. (A)ggregate features are also indicated. Feature rank/importance was
calculated by performing a greedy step-wise comparison over feature subsets [24, 28]. More bullets indicate
greater weight in the final classifier. For brevity, rank is omitted for features having multiple variations.
Link Properties: Link presentation is also of interest.
One heavily weighted feature is if the link is part of a “citation” environment (LINK_IS_CITE). As Tab. 2 shows, citations are 6.5× less likely to be spam. This feature also
correlates well with where in the article the link is placed
(LINK_PLACEMENT). By convention, straightforward hyperlinks (i.e., not citations) are confined to an “External Links”
section at the bottom of an article. Even spam links adhere
to this rule – being placed about 3 /4 of the way through
the article (Tab. 2). Clearly, spammers are not using prominence to solicit reader (or administrative) attention [41].
Although uncommon, when a link appears on the article’s
“discussion” page before it is posted to the article, it tends to
be constructive (LINK_DISCUSSED, Tab. 2). This is likely an
attempt to reach consensus on if the link should be added.
Article Properties: Focus now shifts to the Wikipedia
articles to which links are added. We find that spam tends
to target more popular (ART_POPULARITY_*, Fig. 3c) and
older (ART_TS_CREATION, Tab. 2) articles than ham links.
This may be an attempt to maximize link exposures, but

could also invite administrative scrutiny.
Similarly, the scatter-plot of Fig. 4 shows that the previous
section’s LINK_PLACEMENT feature correlates strongly with
ART_TS_CREATION. Links that are added: (1) far down the
article, on an (2) old article, have a high spam probability.
This is logical: old articles are likely to have mature/stable
content (links included). While citations (likely to be in the
article body) may be required to update an article, it is far
less likely that general “external links” will be ham.
Moreover, articles which have been problematic in the
past tend to continue that trend. This makes an article reputation metric (ART_REPUTATION, per [42] and its API [40])
particularly relevant. In 43% of spam cases, the article had a
recent history of spam and/or vandalism (vs. 24% for ham).
URL/Domain Aggregates: The Wikipedia history of a
web property (i.e., URL or domain) is one of the best indicators of its quality, capturing intuitions such as:
• Web properties with a spam history are suspicious.
• Unusually rapid linking to a web property is suspicious.
• Little editor diversity for a web property is suspicious.
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Figure 3: CDFs for (a) META_COMM_LENGTH, (b) ALEXA_BACKLINKS, (c) ART_POPULARITY_DAY, and (d) DOM_DIVERSITY
UNIT
chars.
% of article
chars.
months
boolean
boolean
boolean

HAM
64
41
26
146
6.3%
53.9%
4.5%

SPAM
38
73
24
192
37.5%
8.3%
2.4%

Table 2: Wikipedia feature comparison.
Non-boolean features presented at median.
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FEATURE
URL_LEN
LINK_PLACEMENT
LINK_TEXT_LEN
ART_TS_CREATION
URL_IS_DOMAIN
LINK_IS_CITE
LINK_DISCUSSED

8
6
4
2
0
0
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0.6

0.8

1

link placement (% in article)

Metadata: Entire anti-vandalism systems have been built
atop revision metadata [42], and such features are now evaluated in an anti-spam setting. For example, the length
of the revision summary/comment (META_COMM_LEN) is the
second-most heavily weighted feature in the classifier. Some
88% of spam leaves this field blank (versus 17% of ham, see
Fig. 3a). Omitting a summary hints that one is not familiar
with Wikipedia conventions and therefore may be unaware
of the linking rules under which the encyclopedia operates.
Prior work [42] also showed that most vandalism happens on weekdays (META_DAY_WEEK) during normal “business
hours” (META_TIME_DAY). However, the inability to localize
UTC timestamps using IP-geolocation (registered users’ IPs
are hidden) hampers comparison with that prior result. Regardless, there exists strong temporal patterns separating
spam and ham edits, as Fig. 5 demonstrates.
11 Domains

capture broad trends which may be able to evade URLspecific analysis. However, some domains may be too broad (e.g.,
social-networking sites). Future work intends to draw distinctions
at all points along a URL’s domain/folder hierarchy.

Figure 4: ART_TS_CREATION vs. LINK_PLACEMENT

tendency-% (+ = ham)

These notions are represented by: (1) raw counts, (2) timedecayed reputations built atop the rollback action [42], and
(3) user-link diversity quotients. Each of these signals is
calculated over varying time windows to capture historical
trends (see Tab 1). Additionally, each feature is quantified
at both URL and domain granularity11 (again, Tab. 1).
Diversity quotients lend themselves to human interpretation. For example, Fig. 3d indicates that 40% of spam links
are added by an editor who is responsible for all recent links
to that domain, versus 15% for ham (DOM_DIVERSITY). No
matter the contributor, long-term prevalence is indicative of
link quality: ham domains have 5× the 6-month quantity of
spam ones (DOM_ADDS_TIME_6MOS).
Reputation and raw counts are also strong benchmarks,
but trend discovery requires multi-dimension analysis (easy
for a classifier, but non-trivial to present). Normalization
is an important component of such reasoning: consider that
YouTube averages nearly 2,000 link additions monthly.
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Figure 5: Day-of-week (DOW, META_DAY_WEEK)
and time-of-day (TOD, META_TIME_DAY)

5.2 Landing Site Processing
Inspired by spam webpage detection [19, 31] (regardless of
the delivery mechanism), our classifier implements a landing
site processing component. However, we find the contribution of these features to be incremental, as the diversity
of inappropriate links added to Wikipedia exceeds that of
“stereotypical” spam. These findings are now summarized.
Language Properties: Foremost, one might expect spam
links to be overwhelming commercial. To quantify this, destination content was run through extensive (1000+ element)
regular expressions capturing marketing terminology. Spam
sites were found to be only marginally more commercial
than ham ones (SITE_COMMERCIAL, Tab. 3), supporting prior
Wikipedia research [41]. In a similar manner, vulgarity was
quantified to mitigate “shock sites” and inappropriateness,
with slightly better results (SITE_PROFANE, Tab. 3).
Literature [19, 31] also describes statistical language properties typical of spam webpages. To this end, we implemented features for the size (SITE_SIZE), compressibility
(SITE_COMPRESS), and a measure of the vocabulary complexity (SITE_VOCAB_LEN) at the destination. While these
features figure moderately in the classifier (see Tab. 1), the
results sometimes disagree with those in prior research. For

UNIT
ratio
ratio
kilobytes
ratio
chars.
boolean

HAM
1.00
1.00
32.99
3.82
4.21
37.3%

60

SPAM
1.03
1.08
27.05
3.97
3.98
33.8%

Percentage of set

FEATURE
SITE_COMMERCIAL
SITE_PROFANE
SITE_SIZE
SITE_COMPRESS
SITE_VOCAB_LEN
SITE_RELEVANT

SEO Tactics: Given that a spammer has taken to Wikipedia to publicize a site, one might expect that he/she would
attempt to maximize traffic via other tactics (i.e., searchengine optimization). Lengthy <meta keywords=". . ."> and
<title> blocks are two simple and common SEO tactics.
Surprisingly, we observe that spam edits have slightly shorter
titles (SITE_TITLE_LEN, 6.8 vs. 7.5 words) and fewer meta
keywords (SITE_NUM_META, 5.3 vs. 6.6 words). This may suggest there is fallacy in assuming the contributor of a spam
link is actually the landing site operator: one could simply
be lobbyist for a particular person or agenda.

5.3 External Data
Next, third-party services are used to discern spam landing sites, namely Alexa Web Information [3] and Google’s
Safe-Browsing project [5, 36]. These well-regarded providers
can perform analysis at a depth and breadth that would otherwise be outside the scope of this work.
Alexa [2, 3]: Alexa is a company producing web-statistics
via Internet usage monitoring and a web crawler. For each
link added, we query their subscription service which provides data about backlinks, traffic patterns, and site hosting.
The quantity of backlinks (ALEXA_BACKLINKS) a landing
site has, as visualized in Fig. 3b, is the feature weighted most
heavily in our classifier. In the median case, a ham site has
≈850 backlinks, compared to just 20 in the spam case (a
40× difference). This is unsurprising given that backlinks
are recognized as a good measure of site reputation and the
basis for well-known search-engine rank algorithms [32].
Site popularity and traffic trends can also capture reputation. One would expect that sites with a consistently
high number of visitors might be appropriate destinations.
Such notions are captured by ALEXA_DELTAS, a meta-feature
(i.e., lower-order classifier) built from ≈50 data points. Its
final rank (Tab. 1) speaks to its predictive nature. Similarly,
reputable sites are likely to be quick loading (ALEXA_SPEED)
and maintain their Internet presence (ALEXA_AGE). At median, spam sites are two years younger than ham ones.

40
20
0

Table 3: Landing site feature comparison.
Non-boolean features presented at median.

example, spam content was found to have slightly shorter average word-lengths than ham (Tab. 3), contrasting with [31].
Other research [29] relies on “language model disagreement”, the notion that spam contributions do not fit the
“context” of the surrounding content. To measure this, a
naı̈ve measure of relevance was constructed: whether the
Wikipedia article title appears verbatim on the landing site
(SITE_RELEVANT). With 37% of ham and 33% meeting this
criteria (Tab. 3), the feature’s weight is nominal. Future
work intends to leverage more rigorous Bayesian and n-gram
probabilities over the entire Wikipedia article. However,
such techniques may scale poorly in a live implementation.

HAM-%
SPAM-%

Asia

Eur.

N. Am. Aust.

Other

Figure 6: Host continent (ALEXA_CONTINENT)
Distinct from reputation, one might consider the genre of
the site content. Alexa indicates adult hosts (ALEXA_ADULT),
and spam sites are 8× more likely to be adult in nature (0.8%
of ham and 6.5% of spam links have this property12 ). One
can also examine where the site is hosted (ALEXA_CONTINENT,
Fig. 6). Similar to email spam [39], Asia and Europe are
common spam sources. In fact, Asia hosts four times as
many Wikipedia spam destinations (relatively) as ham ones.
Finally, in some cases, Alexa is missing data about a URL,
likely because their crawler has yet to encounter it. Missing
data might suggest a site is new or poorly connected, both
indicative of low quality. Empirical data shows that 26%
of spam links have missing crawler data, compared to 5%
for ham links. However, it is somewhat dubious to leverage
the “shortcomings” of another service. Therefore, our current classifier treats such features as “missing”, incurring no
penalty. No feature is codified to formalize this notion.
Google Safe-Browsing [5, 36]: By overlaying machinelearning and virtual-machine sandboxing atop its Internet
crawler, Google produces lists of suspected malware and
phishing sites (GOOG_MALWARE, GOOG_PHISHING). Ostensibly,
utilizing these lists could prevent Wikipedia from becoming
a vehicle for malware delivery and scamming behaviors.
The entire data collection (of 235,000 links) produced just
31 hits on these lists. None of these links were assigned the
“spam” label for a variety of reasons, and thus the features
are a non-factor in the classifier. Nonetheless, this data point
is still described and collected so we can write static rules
(Sec. 7.2) capable of mitigating future malware attacks, regardless of their status quo prevalence.

6. CLASSIFER PERFORMANCE
Having identified individual features, their performance is
now analyzed in combination. To build the classifier, the
Weka [24] implementation of the alternating decision tree
(ADTree) algorithm [21] is used. ADTree is chosen because
of its: (1) performance, (2) support for enumerated and
missing features (as sometimes occur with third-party data),
and (3) output of a human-readable model. All results were
obtained via 10-fold cross-validation over the corpus.
Simple Performance: Results are summarized by Fig. 7
and Tab. 4. Examining precision-recall (Fig. 7a), it is clear
our method significantly outperforms a control classifier.
While pure chance operates at ≈18% precision (the percent of the corpus which is spam), our system has precision
greater than 90% for 80% of the recall spectrum.
12 The

fact that not all adult content is spam underscores why
Wikipedia link spam detection is difficult. An adult film star’s
article can legitimately link to his/her “official site”, but in many
other contexts the same link would be grossly inappropriate.

1

1
1

true-positive rate

1.0% FP-Rate
at 71% Recall

0.8

0.6
0.4

recall

precision

0.8

ALL
(W)
(L)
(T)
RND

0.2
0
0

0.6

0.5% FP-Rate
at 64% Recall

0.4
0.2

recall
0.2

0.4

false-positive rate

0

0.6

0.8

1

0

0.005

0.01

0.6
0.4
0.2
false-positive rate

All
0.015

0.8

0
0.02

0

0.2

0.4

ALL
(W)
(L)
(T)
RND

0.6

0.8

1

Figure 7: Result curves for (a) precision-recall, (b) recall vs. false-positive rate, and (c) ROC.
Feature subsets include: (W)ikipedia, (L)anding site, and (T)hird-party (see Tab. 1).
Also of interest is Fig. 7b, which plots recall as a function
of false-positive (FP) rate. In order for the classifier to autonomously block spam contributions, it must adhere to the
FP-tolerances of the community (see Sec. 7.3). Fig. 7b shows
that 64% of spam could be detected at a 0.5% FP-rate, suggesting that a considerable portion of the spam mitigation
burden could be lifted from human patrollers.
Feature Subsets: Fig. 7a and Fig. 7c also visualize the
performance of feature subsets. Most striking is that the
“Wikipedia” class alone is nearly equivalent in performance
to the complete classifier. While it is encouraging to see the
strong contributions of these novel features, it also forces
one to consider the necessity of the other subsets. However,
by the very nature of wikis and collaborative environments,
it is “Wikipedia” features which are most easily manipulated
(see Sec. 8). Therefore, the robustness of the other sets could
prove critical in capturing evasive tactics and play a greater
role when the live implementation (Sec. 7) is retrained.
Given the quantity and strength of “Wikipedia” features,
it is interesting to examine what “sub-subset” is most heavily
weighted. Such groupings are delineated per the organization of Sec. 5.1. We find that “metadata” (PR-AUC=0.59)
and “URL/domain aggregates” (PR-AUC=0.66) are most
significant, but neither approaches the composite performance of all Wikipedia signals (PR-AUC=0.91, Tab. 4).
This work also implemented features motivated by the
anti-spam efforts of blogs and webpage processing [19, 29,
31]. Of particular interest was how these features, captured
by the “landing site” subset, would fare in a purely collaborative environment. As Fig. 7 shows, this is the worst performing subset by a substantial margin. While discouraging,
it also confirms some of our initial intuition that Wikipedia
spam behaviors are a unique phenomena that require distinct detection machinery from “typical” spam links.
Finally, Alexa features (the force of the “third-party” subset) perform surprisingly well in isolation, especially considering that the service is designed as a marketing data service,
not an anti-spam tool.
Performance Discussion: Unfortunately, our technique
performs far less accurately than state-of-the-art email spam
mitigation schemes. However, the system performs comparably to Wikipedia anti-vandalism classifiers [34], a domain
that has received considerable research attention.
There is little doubt the proposed system can help Wikipedia control status quo spamming behaviors, which might
be characterized as a “nuisance.” More significant is its ability to mitigate aggressive and mechanized tactics that could
lead to pervasive damage. Even in its purest form (i.e., ab-

sent the static rules of Sec. 7.2), we are confident the classifier can deflect the recently proposed attacks of [41]. Static
rules will add an additional level of reassurance.
Throughout this work, evaluation has been performed over
tagged corpus edits, yet these edits compose just 2.5% of
those collected. While definitive and noise-free labels are
advantageous for training, it remains to be seen if the associated edits capture all the subtleties necessary to make
accurate spam/ham predictions. Certainly, a sizable portion of unlabeled data is rife with ambiguity (regarding its
quality), and it is unlikely even human editors could reach a
definitive spam/ham distinction. In a live implementation,
however, all links must be scored and the non-human nature
of our tool might invite criticism over false-positives.
Improving Performance: While the classifier performs
well, future improvements intend to build on this foundation. Data collection is ongoing to improve corpus scope.
Moreover, a corpus built without labeling bias (Sec. 4.2)
would enable additional features. Recently, [33] assembled a
vandalism corpus using outsourced human annotators, and
a similar configuration is imaginable for anti-spam purposes.

7. LIVE IMPLEMENTATION
Having demonstrated that our classifier significantly outperforms random search (the status quo patrol technique), it
seemed prudent to encode the technique for the Wikipedia
community. We undertook this task, with an implementation currently operational on English Wikipedia (opensource code available at [40]). This required practical considerations outside of those encountered with the offline corpus
(Sec. 7.1) and static rules to handle special circumstances
(Sec. 7.2). Further, the tool provides streamlined access to
the classification scores (Sec. 7.3). Fig. 8 visualizes the system model/architecture of this implementation.

7.1 Generalizations
Our corpus was designed with the goal of having accurate
labels, leading to many constraints on the complete set of
edits collected. In practice, however, the classifier should be
able to score all revisions adding an external link(s)13 :
Multiple Links: The corpus contains edits where exactly
one link was added. In order to score revisions contributing
multiple links, we begin by processing each link independently. Then, the score assigned (to the edit) should be the
13 When

scoring a link, the classifier outputs a real-value which
speaks to the probability a revision is link spam (not a binary
prediction). Higher scores are more indicative of spam.

FEATURES
Random
Wikipedia (W)
Landing site (L)
Third-party (T)
Combo (W+L)
Combo (W+T)
Combo (L+T)
All (W+L+T)

PR
0.184
0.909
0.399
0.656
0.902
0.915
0.667
0.917

ROC
0.500
0.968
0.738
0.866
0.965
0.970
0.872
0.971

Table 4: Area-under-curve (AUC)
for precision-recall (PR) and
receiver-operating-characteristic
(ROC), for various feature subsets.
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Figure 8: Architecture for spam detection implementation

maximum of those scores. In this manner, spammers cannot
use constructive links to dilute inappropriate ones.
Non-HTML Destinations: A majority (79%) of destinations are HTML documents, for which there are specific
features. However, other content types can be harnessed
for malicious purposes. To prevent evasion, such additions
are scored without using “landing site” features (at slightly
decreased performance, see Tab. 4).

7.2 Static Rules
Other implementation practicalities are more acute. In
these cases, static scoring rules are installed:
Acquisition Errors: Destinations returning HTTP 4xx or
5xx error codes (e.g., “404 Not Found”) are scored arbitrarily
high. An inaccessible landing site serves no purpose, speaks
to unreliability, and violates policy [11].
Novel Attack Vectors: Recent work [41] has identified
novel link spam attacks, not yet in active use, and therefore
not trained upon. Static detection rules are authored to prevent widespread damage via these channels. For example,
the Safe-Browsing lists [5, 36] (per Sec. 5.3) are utilized in
such a fashion. Similarly, if novel spam strategies do arise,
the classifier can be retrained to capture them.

7.3 Utilizing Revision Scores
Having quantified a probabilistic link spam metric for revisions, these scores need to be applied and disseminated.
One goal is for the system to autonomously undo egregious link additions. Such operation requires Wikipedia approval, which is being sought as of this writing. Generally, a
false-positive tolerance is set and score thresholds are tuned
accordingly. For example, one anti-vandalism bot [18] operates at a FP-rate of 0.5%. Per Sec. 6 and Fig. 7b, our
system could detect 64% of link spam at such tolerances.
Regardless of the outcome of that approval process, patrollers can use classifier scores to prioritize spam search
efforts (i.e., for intelligent routing). This has already been
achieved by interfacing with STiki [40] – GUI software providing crowdsourced access to a shared priority queue of revisions in need of inspection (see Fig. 8). STiki requires only
that ID/score pairs are provided, as its core engine handles
all backend logic (e.g., de-queuing inspected or non-current
revisions). Critically, the human assessments gathered using
the tool can be used to refine scoring techniques.
Finally, an API and IRC feed have been made available [40]
so other developers can access the calculated features/scores.

8. EVASION & GAMESMANSHIP
Having implemented a link spam classifier/scorer for Wikipedia, we now consider how a user might evade our system.
Given spammer’s well-incentivized nature, such attempts at
gamesmanship are a realistic concern.
First, any attacker who is aware of the model and the intuition on which the system is built has some advantage. An
attacker could manipulate his/her edit or landing site so that
it is scored more favorably. Admittedly, some features can
be easily gamed (e.g., META_COMM_LENGTH, the revision summary length). Fortunately, others are more robust in that
they, (1) are not easily affected, or (2) increase marginal
costs for attackers. For example, Sec. 5.3 described the
“traffic” (ALEXA_DELTAS) and “backlinks” (ALEXA_BACKLINKS)
features, which are difficult to manipulate. Similarly, using
Sybil attacks [20] to side-step URL and domain reputations
(URL_REPUTATION and DOM_REPUTATION, Sec. 5.1) would require multiple domain registrations. Such spatio-temporal
signals have been shown difficult to circumvent [26, 42] and
the classifier integrates several features of this kind.
Absent content-optimization against the model, we (nonexhaustively) consider several other attack vectors:
TOCTTOU attack: A time-of-check-to-time-of-use sattack leverages the fact that scoring is performed only at link
addition. By altering destination content (or using redirection) after this time, one can link to sites that would
otherwise be penalized. Such behavior has already been
seen in active use [12] against human patrollers. An obvious
solution is to re-scan sites on some interval and report on
significant scoring changes. This, of course, would require
substantial resources (English Wikipedia currently has some
36 million external links). Scalability could be increased by
producing a whitelist of domains that are trusted to have
stable content.
Crawler redirection: Similar to a TOCTTOU attack, an
attacker could serve benign content to our crawler, but serve
spam content to ordinary visitors. Detecting the IP address
from which our service operates would be straightforward.
One solution is to distribute the fetch operation, possibly
using anonymization networks. Ultimately, such landing site
manipulation is a reason we implemented orthogonal feature
types (i.e., wiki-centric and third-party data).
Denial-of-service: By overwhelming the service with requests (i.e., link additions to Wikipedia) an attacker could
delay the processing of subsequent link spams. In addition to
parallel analysis, our system uses static rules to handle unreasonably large landing sites and edits adding many links.

9.

CONCLUSIONS

In this work, we have described the problem of purely
collaborative link spam and justified the need for its autonomous detection. To this end, we proposed a mitigation
strategy and evaluated it over Wikipedia revisions.
From the outset we suspected that purely collaborative
environments (e.g., wikis) were unique from partially collaborative ones (e.g., blogs) and might require specialized
anti-spam machinery. This was confirmed by implementing
features inspired by past blog/forum research, finding their
performance nominal. These shortcomings, however, were
overcome by leveraging properties specific to wiki environments. When combined with third-party data, features built
on these properties produce an effective and robust classifier.
It is clear this work will benefit the Wikipedia community,
especially given our live implementation of the technique.
Offline analysis demonstrated that two-thirds of Wikipedia
link spam can be automatically mitigated (at low false positives), while prioritizing the remainder for human inspection. This is a considerable improvement over current strategies, which rely on brute-force human effort.
However, this work also intends to have broader implications. Our extensive feature set captures properties that
exist in general-purpose wikis, not simply those specific to
encyclopedic content. Moreover, a performance baseline has
been established on which future work can build. Ultimately, we hope our technique is a foundation towards better
securing the entire collaborative paradigm.
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